Paint on Any Other Canvas: Closing a Copyright Loophole for Street Art on the Exterior of an Architectural Work by Peplow, Emma C.
PEPLOW IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2020 12:08 AM 
 
PAINT ON ANY OTHER CANVAS:  
CLOSING A COPYRIGHT LOOPHOLE FOR 
STREET ART ON THE EXTERIOR OF AN 
ARCHITECTURAL WORK 
EMMA C. PEPLOW† 
ABSTRACT 
  Street art is having a moment. Once criminalized and ardently 
combatted by city governments, street art has become a persistent 
presence in metropolitan cities, social media feeds, and even art 
galleries. Often coming in the form of graffiti murals applied to the 
exterior-facing walls of a building, these works are racking up 
significant price tags at auction houses and are raising property values 
in proximate areas. And yet, despite street art’s recent legitimization by 
the Second Circuit in a historic decision allowing the recovery of 
significant statutory damages upon the destruction of a work of 
recognized stature, a loophole in U.S. copyright law threatens to 
jeopardize these strides. 
  This Note delves into the conflict between the copyright protections 
of buildings and the copyright protections for the street art painted on 
them. A relatively underused amendment to the Copyright Act that 
provides copyright protections for buildings—the Architectural Works 
Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”)—has jeopardized copyright 
protections for street artists. It has allowed companies to prominently 
feature and profit off of the artists’ work in advertising campaigns 
without the artists seeing any financial return for the use.  
  Two recent cases have tested this legal loophole, with companies 
weaponizing the AWCPA—to varying degrees of success—as an 
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affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim brought on by the 
use of street art in their advertisements without permission from the 
artists themselves. These cases represent a significant threat to the 
financial interests of street artists—and in a way that was not 
specifically considered by Congress because street art lacked 
institutional legitimacy at the time of the AWCPA’s enactment. This 
Note argues the proper way forward is for Congress to amend the 
AWCPA to create a level playing field for artists, regardless of the 
medium on which their work exists. 
“Imagine a city where . . . everybody could draw whatever they 
liked . . . . A city that felt like a party where everyone was invited, not 
just the estate agents and barons of big business. Imagine a city like that 
and stop leaning against the wall – it’s wet.” 
Banksy, street artist1 
INTRODUCTION 
On a Sunday morning in September 2017, Londoners awoke to a 
surprise. Outside the Barbican Center, the esteemed British artistic 
institution, were two fresh graffiti works painted by the street-art 
renegade Banksy.2 The Banksy pieces emerged just days prior to the 
opening of the Barbican’s exhibit featuring the work of Jean-Michel 
Basquiat, a street artist turned mainstream darling of the art world,3 
and appeared to sample elements of the late artist’s work.4  
One of the graffiti works featured patrons standing in line for a 
Ferris wheel, but instead of passenger cars, there were crowns, a 
signature symbol found in Basquiat’s work.5 “Major new Basquiat 
show opens at the Barbican–a place that is normally very keen to clean 
 
 1. Paul Gough, Introduction, in BANKSY: THE BRISTOL LEGACY 9, 9 (Paul Gough ed., 2012).  
 2. Roslyn Sulcas, Banksy Strikes Again, with Nod to Basquiat, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2017), 
https://nyti.ms/2jEtjuX [https://perma.cc/6MG2-DHKW]. Banksy, who operates anonymously 
under this pseudonym, is currently one of the most recognizable street artists and is famous for 
their political and social commentary. Gough, supra note 1, at 9–18 (discussing Banksy in the 
context of their 2009 takeover of the Bristol Museum & Art Gallery).  
 3. Jean-Michel Basquiat: The Life and Work Behind the Legend, BBC (July 9, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/culture/story/20150709-jean-michel-basquiat-the-life-and-work-behind-the-legend 
[https://perma.cc/5JXW-3UYS]. 
 4. Sulcas, supra note 2. 
 5. Id. 
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any graffiti from its walls,” Banksy captioned the photo on their6 
personal Instagram.7 
 
FIGURE 1. BANKSY’S BASQUIAT-INSPIRED STREET ART AT THE 
BARBICAN8 
 
Banksy’s second work was a spinoff of Basquiat’s famous painting 
“Boy and Dog in a Johnnypump.”9 The original painting contained an 
almost cartoonish portrait of a boy and a dog standing solitarily on a 
canvas, surrounded by a fiery explosion of brush strokes and color. In 
Banksy’s take, the boy is being frisked by the London Metropolitan 
Police as the dog looks on. “Portrait of Basquiat being welcomed by 
 
 6. Many media outlets refer to Banksy with masculine pronouns, but given that Banksy has 
never revealed their identity, they will be referred to throughout this Note with gender-neutral 
pronouns. See Gough, supra note 1, at 18 n.1 (explaining the choice to use masculine pronouns 
and the multiple-artists theory). Some in the media have speculated their identity is Robin 
Guggingham, a Bristol native. E.g., Jennifer Newton, Artful Dodger: Who Is Banksy?, U.S. SUN 
(Sept. 7, 2020, 1:06 PM), https://www.the-sun.com/news/139073/who-is-banksy [https://perma.cc/
NH47-LKB3]. However, others are convinced Banksy is a contingent of street artists rather than 
a single person. Id.  
 7. Banksy (@banksy), INSTAGRAM (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/
BZJELJiAmb5 [https://perma.cc/5PP6-5PC4]. Instagram has become a preferred platform for 
artists around the world to share photos of their work. The social media app has both raised 
awareness and the price of the most popular pieces posted on the app. For a discussion of 
Instagram’s influence on art, see Nina Siegal, Instagram Takes On Growing Role in the Art 
Market, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1Wb8Nw1 [https://perma.cc/45NU-FZXL]. 
 8. Banksy, supra note 7.  
 9. Sulcas, supra note 2. 
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the Metropolitan Police – an (unofficial) collaboration with the new 
Basquiat show,” Banksy wrote on Instagram.10 
 
FIGURE 2. BANKSY’S BASQUIAT-INSPIRED STREET ART AT THE 
BARBICAN11 
  
Although, at the time, there was some speculation as to what 
exactly Banksy meant by their latest artistic statement, what was clear 
was how much street art has changed between the two artists’ careers. 
Whereas Basquiat’s street art was often criminalized by the 
communities in which he worked,12 Banksy has been lionized.13 
Banksy’s work exposes an irony about how artistic institutions 
 
 10. Banksy (@banksy), INSTAGRAM (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.instagram.com/p/BZJET
E9AlnS [https://perma.cc/P3L2-QSEP]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Basquiat explored themes of race, police brutality, and oppression in his work. His piece 
titled, “Defacement (The Death of Michael Stewart),” was a grief-stricken reaction to the death 
of Black artist Michael Stewart who was beaten and killed by police after allegedly tagging a New 
York subway station wall. Erik Nielson, ‘It Could Have Been Me’: The 1983 Death of a NYC 
Graffiti Artist, NPR (Sept. 16, 2013, 7:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2013/09/
16/221821224/it-could-have-been-me-the-1983-death-of-a-nyc-graffiti-artist [https://perma.cc/
E6MX-LC7Q]. Basquiat, a young Black artist himself who put his graffiti art up all over the city, 
was particularly moved by news of Stewart’s death. “It could have been me,” he said, commenting 
on the criminalization of Black street artists. Id.; see also Fox Butterfield, On New York Walls, 
the Fading of Graffiti, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 1988), https://nyti.ms/29z990z [https://perma.cc/D64B-
H8UR] (detailing efforts by New York City during the ’80s to criminalize or combat graffiti, 
including measures intended to “deny vandals pleasure in seeing their work”). 
 13. Though Banksy painted their work at the Barbican without the museum’s permission, 
the museum actually preserved it and made it a permanent fixture. Julia Gregory, Barbican’s 
Banksy Artworks Become Permanent Fixtures, CITY MATTERS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://
www.citymatters.london/barbicans-banksy-artworks-become-permanent-fixtures [https://perma.
cc/PYJ2-HQHN]. 
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recognize and showcase Basquiat’s work when he applied paint to 
canvas, but something existentially changes when he applied paint to 
building exteriors. Street art, the type Basquiat was originally known 
for, is markedly outside the Barbican. Museums are a place for canvas. 
Banksy’s work incisively comments on the tension surrounding 
which mediums are deserving of being called “art.” A similar battle 
rages on in American copyright law. Street art—which, for the 
purposes of this Note, refers to legally14 commissioned15 art that exists 
on the exterior-facing walls of a building16—currently finds itself in the 
crosshairs of this debate over what changes, as a matter of law, when 
art exists on a building rather than in one. Currently, copyright law 
treats the two works differently, and, as a result, there are gaps in 
copyright protections for street artists based solely on the medium on 
which their work exists.17 To put it in legal terms, the copyright 
protections afforded to street artists depend on the physical 
embodiment in which the work is fixed.18  
 
 14. This Note does not delve into whether street art that is not legally commissioned by the 
buildings’ owners is copyright eligible, though many legal scholars argue that due to the minimal 
requirements of copyright law, it is. See, e.g., Celia Lerman, Protecting Artistic Vandalism: Graffiti and 
Copyright Law, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 295, 296, 307–11 (2013) (“At least some pieces of 
graffiti are suitable for copyright protection, insofar as they are original works, fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.”). However, a recent case squarely presented this issue. Clothing brand H&M 
posted an advertisement featuring a street artist’s illegally painted work and subsequently sought a 
declaratory judgment, asking the court to find that illegal street art is not subject to copyright 
protections. Alan Feuer, Brooklyn Lawsuit Asks if Illegal Graffiti Is Protected by Copyright Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GxrOXA [https://perma.cc/7CRF-HZYP]. After extensive 
public backlash against H&M, it withdrew the lawsuit. See Angie Kordic, UPDATED: H&M Files – 
Then Withdraws! – A Lawsuit Against Revok over His Own Graffiti, WIDEWALLS (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.widewalls.ch/hm-revok-graffiti-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/8V4L-HYK6] (citing an H&M 
Instagram story announcing H&M’s withdrawal of the complaint, stating it “respects the creativity and 
uniqueness of artists, no matter the medium” and “should have acted differently”). 
 15. In certain circumstances where an artist is employed to paint on a building, the copyright 
could belong to the landowner pursuant to the work for hire doctrine, but this is beyond the scope 
of this Note. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2018) (stating if the work was prepared for an employer, the 
copyright belongs to them rather than the creator). Assume for the purposes of this Note that the 
work for hire doctrine does not apply, and thus the street artist in question is the copyright owner. 
 16. Aside from the Banksy pieces discussed in the Introduction, every artwork discussed in 
this Note was legally commissioned with the consent of the building’s owner. The Banksy pieces 
highlight the art world’s evolving understanding of street art rather than illustrate the copyright 
arguments this Note makes.  
 17. Part III describes how street art existing on an exterior-facing wall of a building changes 
the calculus of its copyrightability. 
 18. Although § 101 of the Copyright Act defines “fixed” as “embodiment . . . sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit [the work] to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration,” which would seem to encompass 
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The purpose of copyright law is to grant creators exclusive control 
over most commercially valuable activities involving their work.19 
Copyright law applies to a broad swath of subject matters ranging from 
software code to musical performances.20 In terms of visual art, copyright 
law grants these rights to authors in two distinct ways. First, the Visual 
Artists Rights Act (“VARA”)21 amended the 1976 Copyright Act to 
afford creators the ability to prevent the destruction of their work, as well 
as various other rights including the right to control how their name is 
associated with the work and the right to prevent modifications to a work 
that would be detrimental to artists’ reputation.22 To qualify for the 
protection against destruction, the work must be a “work of recognized 
stature,”23 a largely fact-sensitive determination made by the courts.24 
Only “authors” may assert these rights, and they are waivable.25 Second, 
§ 106 of the Copyright Act26 grants creators a set of exclusive rights over 
the work, including the ability to prevent or authorize reproductions of 
their work.27 To qualify for these protections, a work must meet a minimal 
burden of originality and be fixed in a tangible medium.28 Unlike VARA, 
these rights are assignable or transferable.29 
Street artists have asserted both types of rights to varying degrees 
of success.30 However, street artists have had considerably more success 
under VARA, recently winning a major victory in the Second Circuit. In 
 
street art, see 17 U.S.C. § 101, other provisions indicate that no such protection exists for street 
art fixed on the outside of a building, see infra Part II.D. 
 19. JAY DRATLER, JR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND 
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 6.01 (2020).  
 20. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (granting artists rights against unauthorized recording of live 
musical performances); id. § 117 (defining limitations on the exclusive rights in computer 
programs granted in § 106). 
 21. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A. 
 22. Id. § 106A(a) (granting visual-art creators rights to attribution and integrity, to prevent 
any modification of the work that would be prejudicial to the artist, and “to prevent any 
destruction of a work of recognized stature”). 
 23. Id.  
 24. The Second Circuit defined the test for determining whether a work is of “recognized 
stature” as a “fluid” inquiry into whether the work is of “artistic quality” as defined by the “artistic 
community.” Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e). 
 26. Id. § 106.  
 27. The owner of the copyright has the exclusive rights to reproduce the work, prepare 
derivative works, distribute copies, and display or perform the work publicly. Id.  
 28. Id. § 102. 
 29. Id. § 201(d). 
 30. See infra Part III (discussing various copyright claims made by street artists in recent years).  
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March 2020, the Second Circuit affirmed a $6.75 million award of 
statutory damages for the destruction of street art in Brooklyn.31 For the 
first time, forty-five works of street art were deemed works of 
“recognized stature” as a matter of law and thus were eligible for 
VARA’s protection against destruction.32 The problem is that VARA 
only protects the moral rights of street artists, which often only come 
into play once a work has been destroyed, altered, or misattributed.33  
Section 106 of the Copyright Act, which provides authors with the 
rights to control and authorize reproductions of their work, has proved 
far less successful in protecting street artists as a result of a 1990 
amendment to the 1976 Copyright Act titled the Architectural Works 
Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”).34 Though most street art 
presumably qualifies for copyright protections under § 102—given that 
it is independently created, possesses originality,35 and is fixed in the 
inarguably tangible medium of a wall36—the AWCPA creates a 
 
 31. Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d sub nom. 
Castillo, 950 F.3d at 173. 
 32. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 163, 170.  
 33. VARA grants artists the rights to prevent the intentional mutilation of their work if it would 
be prejudicial to their reputation and to enjoin the destruction of their work if the work is of recognized 
stature. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A)–(B). This right can be exercised either prospectively through an 
injunction or retrospectively through damages. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 22 (1990), as reprinted in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915, 6932 (stating damages and injunctive relief are available for VARA 
violations). However, there are various hurdles involved that make a successful claim for an injunction 
unlikely. For example, to claim prospective VARA relief for mutilation or destruction, an artist would 
need advance notice of the intentional mutilation or destruction, which is made more difficult by the 
fact that VARA rights are not transferable. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (stating VARA rights are not 
transferable). Therefore, if a work is painted on a building and that building is sold, the new owner may 
not know who the artist is nor how to get in touch with them to provide this notice. See David E. Shipley, 
The Empty Promise of VARA: The Restrictive Application of a Narrow Statute, 83 MISS. L.J. 985, 996–
99 (2014) (describing how a pre-VARA case of a fresco being painted over would be litigated post-
VARA and the complications involved). Further, works of street art create further difficulties in 
preliminary injunction hearings due to courts struggling to conceptualize irreparable harm in the street 
art context, especially when property owners’ rights are at stake. See Richard Chused, Moral Rights: 
The Anti-Rebellion Graffiti Heritage of 5Pointz, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 583, 596–97 (2018) (describing 
the preliminary injunction VARA hearings regarding Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P. and how the work at 
issue being street art complicated the analysis). 
 34. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–06, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5133–34 (1990). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 102. As long as a work is “independently created” and contains a “minimal 
degree of creativity,” it is eligible for copyright protection under § 102. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  
 36. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a work as fixed in a tangible medium “when its 
embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration”).  
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complication. According to the amendment, architectural-copyright 
holders do not possess one of the traditional exclusive rights in 
copyright law: the ability to control pictorial representations of the 
architectural works. Pictorial representations and reproductions—such 
as videos or photographs—are explicitly allowed when the subject is an 
architectural work.37 Whether the street art attached to a side of the 
building is part of the architectural work itself is a fact-sensitive 
determination made by the courts.38 Therefore, if the street art is 
considered part of an architectural work, the creator loses all rights to 
prevent or authorize reproductions of their work39—protections that 
they would have had if their work was on any other canvas.40  
Two recent cases tested whether the AWCPA is a loophole for 
copyright protections in street art.41 Both involve car companies that 
posted advertisements of their cars in front of works of street art. The 
main issue in the cases was whether the works of street art were 
extensions of the architectural works—such that their protections were 
swallowed up by the AWCPA—or whether they existed separately 
from the buildings.42 If the latter, then the artists had a valid copyright 
infringement claim against the companies. The courts split in these two 
cases on the question of whether the art existed separately from the 
architectural work.43 As Part III explains, the lack of litigation 
surrounding this particular issue has left the courts with largely ad hoc, 
fact-sensitive factors to make these determinations. 
Currently, if an otherwise-copyrightable work is attached to a 
noncopyrightable object, its creator maintains their copyright protections 
as long as the work can be imagined as existing separately from the 
 
 37. Id. § 120(a). 
 38. Part III outlines three cases that take up this issue. First, a Ninth Circuit case which 
developed the fact-sensitive test for evaluating these claims and then two more recent applications 
of this test as it relates to street art. Infra Part III.  
 39. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding an otherwise-
copyrightable tower was legally an extension of the architectural work to which it was attached 
and thus there could be no separate copyright infringement claim for the tower); see also infra 
Part III (discussing Leicester and similar cases in greater detail). 
 40. See infra Part IV (describing another copyright framework as a potential alternative). 
 41. See generally Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, 19-10949, 19-10951, 2019 WL 
4302769, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019) (rejecting artists’ motion to dismiss on grounds that the street 
art could be legally considered part of the building it exists on); Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 
3d 927, 934 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (denying motion for summary judgment by declining to find that street art is 
legally part of the building it exists on). These cases are discussed in greater depth in infra Part III.  
 42. Infra notes 184–198 and accompanying text. 
 43. Infra notes 184–202 and accompanying text. 
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noncopyrightable element.44 If not for the AWCPA, street art would fall 
within this analysis.45 Legislative history and case law both reflect that the 
Copyright Act considered a building a “useful article,” or a 
noncopyrightable element, prior to the AWCPA.46 Thus, copyrightable 
works, such as street art, that were attached to the exterior walls of 
buildings would be protected so long as they could be imagined separately 
from the building. Now that architectural works are governed by the 
AWCPA, this is no longer the case. This separation of architectural works 
and useful articles in the Copyright Act creates a situation where an 
otherwise-copyrightable work, such as a graphic design, would have the 
full suite of excludability rights when it is emblazoned on a shirt,47 but not 
necessarily when it is applied to a building.48  
However, as Part II.D illustrates, the AWCPA’s efforts to create 
copyright protections for architects led to a statutory overcorrection in 
which copyrightable works fixed on a building exterior were 
overlooked.49 The amendment’s broad language creates a gap in 
protections for street artists both unintended and contrary to the 
purpose of the Copyright Act.50 Thus, this Note argues that the current 
statutory scheme—granting economic relief to street artists to 
compensate for their work’s destruction or detrimental modification 
while allowing major gaps in street artists’ ability to control 
reproductions of their work—is both contrary to the legislative history 
and purpose of the Copyright Act51 and creates an erroneous result in 
which various entities have more meaningful opportunities than the 
artists themselves to profit off of reproductions of their work.  
This Note proposes a two-pronged solution to this copyright 
loophole.52 First, Congress should either update the AWCPA to adopt 
 
 44. Part IV outlines both the original statutory test and the current test for determining the 
copyrightability of otherwise-copyrightable elements—referred to as “pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural elements” or “PGS”—when incorporated into a noncopyrightable element—referred 
to as a “useful article.” Infra notes 225–240 and accompanying text.  
 45. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951 
(“[T]he copyrightability of architectural works shall not be evaluated under the separability test 
applicable to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful articles.”). 
 46. Infra notes 145–147.  
 47. Infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text. 
 48. Infra Part III. 
 49. Infra notes 241–242. 
 50. Infra Part II.B.  
 51. Infra Part II.B.  
 52. Infra Part V. 
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the separability test currently codified in the Copyright Act for 
analyzing the copyrightability of works attached to noncopyrightable 
objects or introduce a definition of “building” within the AWCPA to 
exclude otherwise-copyrightable elements fixed to the exteriors of 
buildings. Second, the pictorial representation exception in the 
AWCPA should be narrowed to better balance protections for street 
artists with the public nature of architecture. This way, copyright law 
can still preserve the visual role that buildings play in citizens’ lives,53 
as the AWCPA legislative history indicates Congress intended, while 
also maintaining protections for artists whose work would be worthy 
of copyright protection had it been on any other canvas.54 
Though other scholarship has explored the confusing landscape of 
the copyrightability of art when attached to utilitarian objects55 and the 
copyrightability of architectural works,56 very little scholarship has delved 
into the tension between copyright protections for buildings and the street 
art attached to them.57 This Note builds off the array of existing 
scholarship about the implications of VARA on street artists’ legal rights58 
and expands the analysis on the other avenue of copyright protections 
available to street artists—the ability to control reproductions—and how 
copyright protections for buildings get in the way. 
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I describes a twentieth 
century existential split in the art world over what constituted art. It 
 
 53. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953 
(discussing the balance between protecting architectural works and allowing the public to engage 
with them). 
 54. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (affording pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works copyright 
protections when incorporated into useful articles but failing to mention copyright protections for 
PGS elements incorporated into architectural works). 
 55. See generally, e.g., Lili Levi, The New Separability, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 709 
(2018) (discussing the new landscape of separability between PGS elements and the utilitarian 
objects to which they are attached after the Star Athletica Supreme Court decision). 
 56. See generally, e.g., Vaughn Drozd, The Building Blocks of Copyright Protection for Architectural 
Works: Roadblock or Masterpiece?, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 607 (2015) (critiquing the 
courts’ test for determining the copyrightability of architectural works and suggesting solutions).  
 57. See generally John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing 
Judges from Aesthetic Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 12 UCLA 
ENT. L. REV. 301 (2005) (addressing the conflict between PGS elements and the architectural works to 
which they are attached and how the AWCPA affects this analysis). Attorney John Fowles advocates 
for the bright-line test that the AWCPA creates by exempting PGS elements from copyright 
protections when they are attached to a building. Id. at 333–44. This Note argues the opposite—namely, 
that Congress should update the statute to protect these PGS elements, including street art.  
 58. See generally Timothy Marks, Note, The Saga of 5Pointz: VARA’s Deficiency in 
Protecting Notable Collections of Street Art, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 281 (2015) (arguing 
VARA offers insufficient protection for street art). 
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tracks changes in the art world leading to the popularization and 
commoditization of street art and introduces the current statutory 
scheme affording copyright protections to street art. Paralleling this 
shift in the art world, Part II explores how copyright law evolved to 
accommodate this evolving definition of art and introduces the 
AWCPA as an example. Part III details the AWCPA’s application as 
a loophole to street artists’ copyright protections. Part IV demonstrates 
how the history of “useful articles” within copyright law presents a 
helpful model in addressing copyrightable street art on buildings. 
Lastly, Part V proposes amending the AWCPA to expressly assert the 
rights afforded to art incorporated into the exteriors of architectural 
works. 
I.  OUTSIDE THE BOX: POSTMODERNISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
DEFINITION OF ART 
Understanding the emergence of artists like Banksy and the 
unique legal challenges inherent to street art begins with understanding 
the radical change that occurred in Western society’s conception of art 
in the early twentieth century. Let’s paint the scene. The year was 1917, 
and Marcel Duchamp, already an established artist, shocked the art 
world by submitting, under a pseudonym, a porcelain urinal titled 
“Fountain” to an exhibition put on by the Society of Independent 
Artists.59 “Fountain” was one of Duchamp’s first “readymades,” a term 
he coined to describe his new artistic concept.60 The “readymade” was 
a utilitarian, mass-produced, often household item that had been given 
a title and inscription, therefore transforming it into a piece of art.61 
The creation was as simple as it was radical. It bore its name as it was 
 
 59. See Mary Weppler, The Archetype of the Trickster Examined Through the Readymade 
Art of Marcel Duchamp, 13 INT’L J. OF ARTS THEORY & HIST. 11, 11–12 (2018) (describing 
Duchamp’s use of everyday objects as sculptures “already made”). 
 60. Though Duchamp is largely credited with the concept of the “readymade,” many art 
historians have argued that his work, and Western modern art itself, cannot be understood 
without the context of African art’s influence, as it was widely collected and displayed in the 
United States at the turn of the century. See generally Okwui Enwezor, The Postcolonial 
Constellation: Contemporary Art in a State of Permanent Transition, in ANTIMONIES OF ART AND 
CULTURE: MODERNITY, POSTMODERNITY, CONTEMPORANEITY 207, 207 (2009) (explaining how 
Western views of African art shaped Western modern art); Thomas Folland, Readymade 
Primitivism: Marcel Duchamp, Dada, and African Art, 43 ART HIST. 670 (2020) (arguing African 
art inevitably influenced Duchamp’s “readymade” work).  
 61. See Weppler, supra note 59, at 12 (describing Duchamp’s “readymades” as a concept 
where “the artist’s idea takes precedence over aesthetic consideration of the art object”). 
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made ready for display. It was the artist’s mind that made these 
utilitarian objects art, not their hand.62 The institutional art world, 
however, rejected the idea that a “readymade”—an object made for a 
solely utilitarian purpose—could constitute art. The Society, of which 
Duchamp was a member, hid “Fountain” from view at the exhibition, 
rejecting the idea that it was art befitting of museum display.63  
Despite an initially lukewarm welcome from the art world, the 
surging popularity of the pop art movement in the second half of the 
twentieth century pushed Duchamp’s “readymade” concept into 
mainstream culture and further reimagined the boundaries of art. This 
re-envisioning of the “readymade” earned its first notoriety in 1964, 
when a young and burgeoning commercial artist, Andy Warhol, 
created an almost identical replica of the soap pad brand Brillo’s 
packaging and displayed it proudly in the Stable Gallery.64 At the time, 
the boxes met mixed reviews.65 Museums were for Monet’s water 
lilies,66 for Velázquez’s depictions of Spanish royalty,67 for David’s 
conjuring of the French Revolution,68 but certainly not for boxes of 
cleaning pads, especially ones that could be found under the sink in any 
average household. But to a growing number of critics,69 they were 
proof of Warhol’s brilliance, and they would catapult him into a career 
of creating works that “transfigured” common objects into “pure art.”70 
 
 62. See id. (quoting a defense of “Fountain,” probably written by Duchamp himself, stating: 
“Whether Mr. Mutt . . . made the Fountain or not has no importance. He CHOSE it. He took an 
ordinary article of life, placed it so that its useful significance disappeared under the new title and 
point of view—created a new thought for that object” (quoting The Richard Mutt Case, THE 
BLIND MAN, no. 2, 1917, at 5, INT’L DADA ARCHIVE, http://sdrc.lib.uiowa.edu/dada/blindman/2 
[https://perma.cc/RME3-C4EP])).  
 63. See id. (quoting the president of the society as calling the work “by no definition, a work 
of art” (citing CALVIN TOMPKINS, DUCHAMP: A BIOGRAPHY 182 (1996))). 
 64. Paul Mattick, The Andy Warhol of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Andy Warhol, 
CRITICAL INQUIRY, Summer 1998, at 966. 
 65. Adrian Levy & Cathy Scott-Clark, Warhol’s Box of Tricks, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2010, 
7:03 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2010/aug/21/warhol-brillo-boxes-scandal-
fraud [https://perma.cc/NGM8-2JE9]. 
 66. E.g., Claude Monet, Water Lilies, ART INST. OF CHI. (1906), https://www.artic.edu/
artworks/16568/water-lilies [https://perma.cc/HUD7-A4GJ].  
 67. E.g., Diego Velázquez, Las Meninas, MUSEO DEL PRADO (1656), https://www.
museodelprado.es/en/the-collection/art-work/las-meninas/9fdc7800-9ade-48b0-ab8b-
edee94ea877f [https://perma.cc/92S3-3GUE]. 
 68. E.g., Jacques-Louis David, The Oath of the Horatii, LOUVRE (1784), https://www.
louvre.fr/en/oeuvre-notices/oath-horatii [https://perma.cc/4BKU-5HQL].  
 69. Levy & Scott-Clark, supra note 65. 
 70. Arthur Danto, The Artworld, 61 J. PHIL. 19, 580 (1964). 
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Warhol and the pop artists of the 1960s, inspired by Duchamp,71 
reimagined the confines of what was worthy of being called art. The 
great genius—and perhaps, hypocrisy—of their work was that they 
could place a box of cleaning supplies, a tire print,72 and even 
cheeseburgers73 into the hallowed halls of the nation’s leading 
museums, and it was transfigured into something to be oohed and 
aahed at, something with intrinsic value and worthy of recognition. 
Something the highbrow would put in their home and the lowbrow 
would see a piece of themselves in. 
Pop art, and the postmodernist movement as a whole, was a 
largely visceral reaction to modernism.74 The modernists called for the 
complete separation of functional and aesthetic properties. 
Functionality had no place in visual art to modernists,75 whereas 
postmodernists revered the marriage of the aesthetic and the 
functional in all mediums of art.76 In a sense, the modernist movement 
was aware of the limitations of art in a way that postmodernists were 
not.77 A modernist, realizing she will never fully be able to recreate a 
bowl of fruit on a two-dimensional surface, will paint the fruit without 
attempting to trick the viewer into seeing three dimensionality.78 In 
fact, it may not resemble a bowl of fruit at all. Instead, the title informs 
the viewer what the series of discrete shapes, lines, and colors depicts. 
The modernist wants the viewer to know a painting is just paint and 
 
 71. See Weppler, supra note 59, at 12 (describing “Brillo Box” as an “homage to the 
readymade”). 
 72. See Robert Rauschenberg, Automobile Tire Print, S.F. MUSEUM OF MOD. ART (July 
2013), https://www.sfmoma.org/essay/automobile-tire-print [https://perma.cc/62JV-2FVS]. 
 73. See Claes Oldenburg, Two Cheeseburgers, with Everything (Dual Hamburgers), 
MUSEUM OF MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/81183 [https://perma.cc/7G7J-
VN59]. 
 74. Nicholas Alden Riggle, Street Art: The Transfiguration of the Commonplaces, 68 J. 
AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM, no. 3, 2010, at 244. 
 75. See Megan Gambino, Ask an Expert: What is the Difference Between Modern and Post-
Modern Art?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 22, 2011), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-
culture/ask-an-expert-what-is-the-difference-between-modern-and-postmodern-art-87883230 
[https://perma.cc/9WED-TNHZ] (describing modernist art as not “hav[ing] to exist for any kind 
of utility value other than its own existential reason for being”). 
 76. See Danto, supra note 70, at 580–81 (describing Warhol’s rebellion from modernist 
ideals). 
 77. See FRANCIS FRASCINA, MODERN ART AND MODERNISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 6 
(1982) (describing modernism as “us[ing] art to call attention to art” and all of its limitations). 
 78. See id. (describing modernist painters’ works as “frank[ly] . . . declar[ing] the surfaces on 
which they were painted” and leaving “no doubt as to the fact that the colors used were made of 
real paint that came from pots or tubes”). 
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canvas. A postmodernist dreams bigger. To a postmodernist, art does 
not have to tell the viewer what it is, because art can be whatever the 
artist wants it to be.79 Therefore, Warhol’s extremely realistic 
recreations of Campbell’s soup cans80 were a postmodernist reaction to 
the modernist rendering of Georges Braque’s glass of absinthe, which 
depicts lines and geometric shapes on a canvas rather than realistically 
depicting what the title claims it to be.81 
This existential shift in the art world brought on by 
postmodernism, which interrogated not only the subject matter worthy 
of portrayal but also the mediums on which art can exist, is crucial to 
understanding the rise and legitimization of street art.82 Whereas pop 
art grappled with whether “everyday objects” could be art, street art 
grappled with whether “post-museum art” could exist.83 Could art be 
consumed by the masses where the masses exist? 
The graffiti art movement began in the 1970s and 1980s84 as largely 
an exercise in “tagging.”85 Graffiti artists would create an artistic 
rendering of their name and place it on subway cars or buildings 
around New York City.86 The city government aggressively combated 
this practice, and yet graffiti continued to grow in popularity as it 
 
 79. See Postmodernism, MUSEUM OF MOD. ART, https://www.moma.org/collection/terms/84 
[https://perma.cc/HL5V-5MGT] (defining postmodernism as a “refusal to recognize the authority 
of any single style or definition of what art should be”). 
 80. E.g., Andy Warhol, Campbell’s Soup Cans, MUSEUM OF MOD. ART (1962), https://www.
moma.org/collection/works/79809?include_uncataloged_works=1&locale=en&package_id=WSC&
page=1&sov_referrer=package [https://perma.cc/8Y3V-6PJD]. 
 81. E.g., Georges Braque, Glass of Absinthe, ART GALLERY OF NEW S. WALES (1911), 
https://www.artgallery.nsw.gov.au/collection/works/410.1997 [https://perma.cc/8XCH-LMVD]. 
 82. See Riggle, supra note 74, at 243 (discussing that after Warhol’s Brillo Boxes “allow[ed] 
everyday objects and events” into museums, it spawned another reaction—“taking art out of the 
museum, gallery, and private collection”). 
 83. Id. at 243–44. 
 84. In this instance, the graffiti art movement refers to when artists began spraying aerosol 
paint messages and symbols on buildings in major metropolitan cities like New York and Los 
Angeles. However, graffiti art has existed in some form since early cave paintings. Its varied uses 
became culturally and politically significant in the Victorian era and began to be artistically 
appropriated in the early nineteenth century. For a more in-depth discussion of the history of 
graffiti art, see generally PHOEBE HOBAN, BASQUIAT: A QUICK KILLING IN ART 36–37 (1998) 
(describing Basquiat’s early street art and the street art culture of the 1980s). 
 85. See Mitch Sawyer, Hip Hop, Punk, and the Rise of Graffiti in 1980s New York, ARTSY 
(May 8, 2017, 6:24 PM), https://www.artsy.net/article/artsy-editorial-hip-hop-punk-rise-graffiti-
1980s-new-york [https://perma.cc/2QDA-7WEK] (describing early graffiti tags as “[a] name and 
maybe a street number, slapped down quick to avoid the police”). 
 86. Id.  
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merged with pop culture.87 As a result, galleries began to welcome the 
work of street artists like Basquiat, who previously was a part of a 
graffiti art collaboration called SAMO, so long as the work was painted 
on canvas.88 Concurrently, as street art expanded past tagging and 
became more of an artistic form, major urban centers began to 
welcome graffiti art on their streets.89 And as hip hop exploded onto 
the pop culture scene, graffiti art bled into the mainstream.90 
Today, street art’s prevalence has hit a fever pitch. As street art 
continues to gain notoriety, museums have taken note, putting on 
exhibitions to showcase street art.91 When possible, elite auction houses 
like Sotheby’s even hold auctions for the works.92 Recent studies show 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Jean-Michel Basquiat, ARTNET, http://www.artnet.com/artists/jean-michel-basquiat 
[https://perma.cc/JVW7-F4E4]. 
 89. As it existed in its early stages featuring just names or common phrases scrawled on walls 
in nonstylized penmanship, tagging was likely not copyrightable. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2020) 
(stating “words and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans” as well as “mere variations 
of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring” are not copyrightable).  
 90. In fact, many of the first graffiti artists were hip-hop artists. Graffiti was often used in the 
’70s and ’80s to announce a new breakdancing pose—a “freeze”—or to advertise for “warehouse 
parties and underground jam sessions” for hip-hop musicians. Robert ‘3D’ Del Naja, Jean-Michel 
Basquiat: The Street-Art Inspiration for Massive Attack, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2013, 11:25 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2013/oct/14/jean-michel-basquiat-street-art-massive-
attack [https://perma.cc/PWW3-EDLE] (describing use of graffiti to announce gatherings among 
hip-hop artists in the ’80s); see also Sally Banes, Physical Graffiti: Breaking Is Hard To Do, VILL. 
VOICE (1981), reprinted in AND IT DON’T STOP! THE BEST AMERICAN HIP-HOP JOURNALISM 
OF THE LAST 25 YEARS 7, 10 (Raquel Cepeda ed., 2004) (spotlighting how graffiti was used within 
the hip-hop breakdancing community).  
 91. See, e.g., Street Art—Exhibition at Tate Modern, TATE MOD. (2008), https://www.tate.org.uk/
whats-on/tate-modern/exhibition/street-art [https://perma.cc/99XE-D4M] (describing the “first major 
public museum display of street art in London” inside the museum as well as a “Street Art Walking Tour”); 
Shelley Leopold, Street Art at MOCA, LA WKLY. (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.laweekly.com/street-art-at-
moca [https://perma.cc/CVN4-9GUJ] (describing the exhibit on street art as “the country’s first major 
street-art and graffiti retrospective”); Eliot Stein, The World’s Largest Street Art Museum Is Opening in 
Berlin, CONDÉ NAST TRAVELER (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/the-worlds-largest-
street-art-museum-is-opening-in-berlin [https://perma.cc/GX7G-GUMQ] (describing the open-air Berlin 
Museum for Urban Contemporary Art as “the world’s biggest museum devoted entirely to street art”). 
 92. See From the Streets: The Rise of Urban Art, SOTHEBY’S (Nov. 9, 2017), https://
www.sothebys.com/en/articles/from-the-streets-the-rise-of-urban-art [https://perma.cc/F7KY-
YD6B] (listing street art auctions or selling exhibitions that occurred at Sotheby’s locations in 
London, Hong Kong, and New York); see also Collecting Guide: 5 Things To Know About Street 
Art, CHRISTIE’S (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.christies.com/features/Street-Art-Collecting-
Guide-9396-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/23RG-3WNF] (providing collectors with tips on how to 
assess the value of artists who are “finding their way into the home”). 
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that street art raises the prices of proximate real estate,93 leading to an 
increase in developers investing in murals to boost property values and 
bring tourists to cities.94 At auctions, physical walls and vans that 
contain renowned works of street art regularly sell for hundreds of 
thousands of dollars.95 Once seen as outlaws, Basquiat’s96 and 
Banksy’s97 names are now woven into the contemporary zeitgeist. 
However, as Part II illustrates, copyright law’s attempts to grapple 
with existential changes in what constitutes art led to the enactment of 
the AWCPA, which introduced a substantial exception to copyright’s 
usual protections. 
II.  THE CHANGING STATUTORY SCHEME OF COPYRIGHT AND THE 
AWCPA 
This Part first identifies the two avenues street artists have for 
recovery within contemporary copyright law. Next, it discusses the 
history of U.S. copyright law and tracks Congress’s attempts to keep 
pace with a rapidly changing art world, which eventually led to the 
AWCPA’s enactment in 1990. Further, this Part frames how 
architectural works were treated under the Copyright Act throughout its 
evolving treatment of functional, rather than historically artistic, works. 
Lastly, it explores how the AWCPA currently operates as a compromise 
 
 93. Kelly Pedro, As Public Art Goes Up, So Do Nearby Home Prices, REALTOR (Apr. 25, 
2018), https://www.realtor.com/news/trends/public-art-holds-key-unlocking-real-estate-growth 
[https://perma.cc/8LH8-HYFS]. 
 94. Diana Hubbell, Street Art Has Become a Global Business—And Artists Are Worrying Over Its 
Future, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/going-out-
guide/wp/2018/08/31/street-art-has-become-a-global-business-now-artists-are-worrying-over-its-future 
[https://perma.cc/W6DN-Q299] (outlining investments in street art in cities across the United States). 
 95. Paul Sullivan, Collecting Street Art: Have Room on Your Wall for a Wall?, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 8, 2016), https://nyti.ms/29DBxfL [https://perma.cc/55X9-UY6F]. 
 96. Seen as one of the pioneers of mainstream hip-hop culture, Basquiat has become a common 
reference in contemporary hip-hop music. E.g., JAY-Z, MOST KINGZ (Roc Nation 2013) (“Inspired 
by Basquiat, my chariot’s on fire/Everybody took shots, hit my body up, I’m tired.”); see Andrew 
Boryga, Hip-Hop Finds an Artist To Believe In, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2011), https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/fashion/jean-michel-basquiat-an-artist-the-hip-hop-world-can-believe 
-in.html [https://perma.cc/9UPR-D5L7] (noting that Jay-Z, Nas, Kanye West, Rick Ross, and others 
have referenced Basquiat in their tracks).  
 97. In holding that street art was visual art of recognized stature under VARA and thus 
eligible for statutory protections, the Second Circuit cited Banksy’s work as an example of how 
street art has become “high art” in many respects. Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 
167–68 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Chused, supra note 33, at 597–98). 
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between protecting a narrow class of architectural works and allowing 
the masses to engage with the public art form through a broad exception. 
A. Street Art and Copyright Law: A Tale of Two Statutory Schemes 
Today, copyright law protects authors’ interest in realizing the 
commercial value of their work by prohibiting, and providing an 
opportunity to recover for, the commercial exploitation of the work.98 It 
does this by granting the author exclusive rights to control and authorize 
certain enumerated commercial activities relating to their work.99 
For visual art, which encompasses most forms of street art, the 
copyright law furthers this goal in two main ways. The first, as mentioned 
previously, is VARA,100 which affords artists the right to prevent the 
destruction of visual art of “recognized stature,”101 among other rights 
including rights of attribution and rights against detrimental 
modification.102 Whether a work is of “recognized stature” is a fact-
sensitive determination for the courts that is outside the scope of this 
Note.103 VARA only affords economic relief when a work has been 
damaged, destroyed, or altered.104 In 2018, and in a major step for 
expanding legal protections to street art, a federal district court in 
Brooklyn deemed several works of street art graffiti to be of “recognized 
stature” for the first time,105 thus entitling the artists to statutory damages 
for the destruction of their work.106 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
decision in 2020, marking a huge win for street art protections.107  
 
 98. DRATLER, JR., supra note 19, § 6.01. 
 99. Id.  
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2018). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. § 106A(a)(1)–(2) (granting artists rights to “claim authorship of that work,” “to 
prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not 
create” or “in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would 
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”). 
 103. The Second Circuit’s determination of whether street art was of “recognized stature” 
was based on “artistic quality” as defined by the “artistic community, comprising art historians, 
art critics, museum curators, gallerists, prominent artists, and other experts.” Castillo v. G&M 
Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 166 (2d Cir. 2020). 
 104. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).  
 105. Cohen v. G&M Realty L.P., 320 F. Supp. 3d 421, 437–41 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d sub nom. 
Castillo, 950 F.3d 155. 
 106. Castillo, 950 F.3d at 171.  
 107. Id. at 170.  
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Parallel to VARA, the second avenue within the Copyright Act 
allowing for statutory damages during the lifespan of the work is the 
exclusive rights granted to the creators of pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works.108 Copyright holders for these works are afforded the 
exclusive rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works based 
upon the original, and to distribute copies by sale or other transfer of 
ownership.109 Copyright holders can sue for infringement if their work 
is reproduced, adapted, published, or performed without their 
authorization.110 To receive protection, works must meet minimally 
burdensome eligibility requirements. Copyright only requires the work 
be original and be fixed in a tangible medium.111 In all cases, it is a fact-
sensitive inquiry; however, as long as the work is an independent 
creation with a slight amount of creativity and is fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression,112 copyright protection attaches.113  
Divorced from the architectural-works considerations Part II.D 
discusses, visual art, like murals, generally meets the copyright 
requirements. Thus, its creators are able to control or authorize 
reproductions of the image in both photographic and video formats, 
subject to a few exceptions.114 Walls are inarguably a tangible 
medium;115 therefore, as long as the street art passes the originality 
requirement, it should be eligible for copyright protections. The 
originality inquiry is a low bar, but it will occasionally disqualify works 
of visual art. For example, a word written in normal penmanship may 
not pass the originality bar; but, if the word were transcribed in a 
stylized font, it would most likely pass.116 
 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. §§ 101, 102(a)(5). However, copyright infringement analysis is also subject to fair use 
limitations, and thus, defendants can assert a fair use defense in certain instances. Id. § 107. 
 111. Id. § 102. 
 112. Id. § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in 
a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”). 
 113. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (stating the 
Copyright Act requires only independent creation and a “minimal degree of creativity”). 
 114. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (carving out exceptions for fair uses of copyrighted material). 
 115. See id. § 101 (defining a work as “‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its 
embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration”). 
 116. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2020) (stating “words and short phrases such as names, titles, 
and slogans” as well as “mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring” are 
not copyrightable). 
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Regardless of the fact that street art both meets the requirements for 
copyright law and is well suited to its underlying purpose, copyright law 
has historically struggled to adapt to the changing world of art. As the 
remainder of this Part illustrates, copyright law has attempted various 
solutions to resolve the conflict between addressing the copyrightability 
of functional objects, like buildings, and the copyrightability of aesthetic 
works, like murals. Moreover, as Part III demonstrates, this tension has 
resulted in an overcorrection in the statutory framework that has left 
street art uniquely vulnerable to infringement.117 
B. History of U.S. Copyright Law 
The story of the development of U.S. copyright law is inevitably 
one of push and pull between the art world and the legal world.118 As 
the art world grappled with the boundaries and limitations of what 
constitutes art, Congress grappled with how to enact protections for a 
rapidly changing field,119 and judges struggled with how to make 
aesthetic judgments when applying copyright law.120 The central 
 
 117. Infra Part III. 
 118. Nowhere is this tension more famously articulated than in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
opinion in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing: 
  It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and 
most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to miss 
appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had learned the 
new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, 
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protection 
when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which 
appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any 
public, they have a commercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic 
and educational value—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt. It is 
an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change.  
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903). 
 119. See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.01 (1963) 
(“In some sense, copyright represents a sustained reaction to developing technology.”). The 
nineteenth century saw the introduction of copyright protections for photography, musical 
compositions, and engravings. JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE 
VOICE, AND THE LAW 49 (1991). The twentieth century introduced protections for PGS works 
applied to useful articles as well as architectural works. See infra notes 136–140 & Part II.B. 
 120. This Note argues that copyright law inevitably involves value judgments and adopting 
different theories of art as they arise. This assumption has been written about at length by 
scholars. See generally Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-
Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175 (1990) 
(asserting Congress and judges alike inevitably rely on artistic judgments in copyright law, though 
they attempt to avoid it); Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 247 (1998) (arguing that though judges do not explicitly adopt aesthetic theories in their 
copyright decisions, they are necessarily lurking in the backdrop of copyright opinions).  
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conflict in American copyright law revolves around how to define the 
boundaries in the inherently subjective field of art and creation.121 
Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the Constitution provides the hook for 
copyright protections, allocating the power to Congress to “promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts” by allowing “Authors and 
Inventors” the “exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” for a limited time.122 This provision authorizes Congress 
to grant rights to creators to provide the public benefit of promoting 
innovation in the arts and sciences.123 Under this authority, Congress 
enacted the first Copyright Act in 1790.124 
Throughout the history of copyright law, Congress has frequently 
updated the Copyright Act to attempt to keep pace with the rapidly 
evolving definition of art.125 One way it achieved this was by updating 
the list of works eligible for copyright protections to be in vogue with 
the cultural definition of art at the time.126 This has often been driven 
by judges’ arguably aesthetic judgments127 of what constitutes art, and 
is thus copyrightable.128 Another way, and the most relevant for the 
 
 121. Many scholars have commented on how American copyright law has evolved and 
changed based on internalized notions of artistic theory. For example, the romantic movement in 
the late nineteenth century greatly influenced which writings were protected and the requisite 
amount of originality necessary for copyrightable works. This artistic theory then gave U.S. 
copyright law a justification for providing authors with greater property rights over their work, 
even if they contained very minimal originality, because romanticism saw creations as an 
extension of the author’s self. Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private 
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 32–33 (1994). 
 122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. “Science” is understood to cover creative works by authors 
and is the hook for copyright law, whereas “useful [a]rts” has been interpreted to cover inventions 
and is the hook for patent law. NIMMER, supra note 119, § 1.03[A][2]. 
 123. See NIMMER, supra note 119, § 1.03 (describing the “dual premises” off of which the 
grant of congressional power is based). 
 124. Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124. 
 125. See NIMMER, supra note 119, § 2A.03[A] (discussing Congress grappling with how to 
designate copyright protections for photography, architecture, and computers). 
 126. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 207–12 (1954) (describing additions to copyrightable 
works of art in successive copyright statutes, including works such as etchings, musical 
compositions, and sculptures). 
 127. See supra note 120. 
 128. A classic example of value judgments made in Congress and the courts over what 
constitutes art occurred in the late-nineteenth century around the idea of whether a photograph 
was copyrightable. There was an intense debate about whether taking a photograph was a 
mechanical process or a creative one. Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of 
Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 399–402 (2004). 
Many believe it was Matthew Brady’s moving Civil War photography that helped shift 
perceptions of photography from it being a mechanical reproduction to it being a fine arts 
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purposes of this Note, was by attempting to strike a balance between 
providing protections for a work that is copyright eligible versus 
something that is simply functional.129 The postmodern movement as a 
whole, though, made this balance difficult. This movement expanded 
art past neat distinctions between objects that were simply functional 
and objects that were simply aesthetic.130 Postmodernists created works 
that were both, and thus copyright law had to grapple with how to fit 
these changing circumstances.131 Eventually, the Copyright Act 
allowed elements of utilitarian objects to be copyrightable if they could 
be conceptually or physically separated from the functional 
components of the work.132 These copyrightable elements form one 
part of a broader category of protectable works called “pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural works,” or “PGS.”133 The Copyright Act of 1976 
codified this new test for eligibility based on separability. When faced 
with a utilitarian object with potentially copyrightable elements, the 
test asks: Are there original artistic elements present? If yes, can those 
elements be separated from the utilitarian aspects of the article?134  
 
discipline. GAINES, supra note 119, at 49. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld an amendment 
to the Copyright Act expanding copyright protections to photographs, finding the portrait in 
question was “useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful,” but leaving open that other 
photographs may not meet the requisite originality needed for copyrightability. Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884). In other words, the Court used “an elaborate 
statement of the work’s beauty” to justify the copyrightability of an arguably mechanical, 
functional medium. Yen, supra note 120, at 268.  
 129. See NIMMER, supra note 119, § 2A.03[B] (framing the tension between “artistic creativity 
deserv[ing] protection at the same time that the evils of monopolizing functional activities must be 
avoided”). 
 130. Supra Part I. 
 131. In the twentieth century, various cases demonstrate how courts grappled with the 
copyrightability of design elements existing in the context of a useful article and often expanded 
protections for works that seemed to merge the functional and the aesthetic. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 
214 (finding a statuette acting as a lamp base to be copyrightable); Brandir Intern v. Cascade Pac. 
Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146–48 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding a sculptural bike rack that had 
received recognition from artistic institutions was not copyrightable); Barnhart v. Econ. Cover 
Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418–19 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding polystyrene mannequins are not 
copyrightable); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(finding belt buckle designs to be copyrightable). It is difficult to find consistency among these 
decisions, as they were arguably based on aesthetic judgments about what is or is not worthy of 
being called art. For a discussion of how aesthetic theories played into these decisions, see Yen, 
supra note 120, at 275–84. 
 132. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (providing protections for 
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works that can exist separate from the useful articles into which 
they are incorporated); infra Part IV. 
 133. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.  
 134. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668. 
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For example, consider an otherwise-copyrightable photograph 
printed on the side of a mug. As long as it satisfies the other eligibility 
requirements, if the photograph can be imagined existing divorced 
from the mug, the photograph is copyrightable on its own. Thus, a third 
party could not print the same photograph on a shirt without infringing 
the mug creator’s copyright.135 Another way of framing this inquiry is 
to ask why consumers care about the photograph on the mug and from 
where does it derive its value. Consumers may care about the 
photograph because of the way it looks or because of the ideas it 
expresses. Conversely, if the mug is at issue, consumers care about it 
because of its utilitarian function, not its appearance. The mug’s 
purpose is to hold coffee in the morning, not express ideas. Therefore, 
the mug, on its own without the photograph, would not be eligible for 
copyright protections.136 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, the crux of conceptual separability 
reflected the modernist binary between functional and aesthetic 
properties.137 According to this viewpoint, each element could be neatly 
divided into serving a functional purpose or an aesthetic purpose, but 
there was very little middle ground. Similarly, the seminal Supreme Court 
case defining the standard for aesthetic originality set the bar very low,138 
while the Copyright Act continued to set the standard for overriding 
functionality quite high.139 However, as the art world melded functional 
innovation and aesthetic innovation, courts began to engage in ad hoc 
 
 135. The Court’s recent decision regarding the separability test illustrates this idea by using an 
example of a painting on a guitar being recreated on an album cover, explaining the painting would 
be copyrightable “whether it is first drawn on the album cover and then applied to the guitar’s 
surface, or vice versa.” Star Athletica v. Varsity Brand, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012–13 (2017).  
 136. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (“Unless the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies’ dress, 
food processor, television set or any other industrial product contains some element that, 
physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that 
article, the design would not be copyrighted under bill.”). 
 137. Similar to the modernist movement, which favored the separation of aesthetic and 
functional components, the 1976 Copyright Act offered copyright protections for PGS elements 
but not for useful articles. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541; see supra notes 
74–81 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that in 
order to be considered original, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice”). 
 139. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”).  
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determinations of copyrightability when works fit into the middle ground 
between their functional and aesthetic properties.140 Architectural works 
are one category that occupied this middle ground. Accordingly, the 
courts’ historic treatment of architectural works provides a useful 
framework for analyzing Congress’s evolving views on the 
copyrightability of objects defined by their functionality.  
C. Architectural Works pre-1990 
Under every version of the Copyright Act prior to 1990, 
architectural works were not expressly protected.141 However, 
architectural works were often protected under the “technical drawings, 
diagrams, and models” provision of the 1976 Copyright Act.142 Section 
101 defines “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to 
convey information.”143 Useful articles were by and large not copyright 
eligible as they fell on the wrong side of the functional versus aesthetic 
calculus reflected in the modernist binary.144  
Though architectural works were not an explicitly protected medium 
within the Copyright Act, they were often protected on an ad hoc basis by 
courts.145 In fact, in the lead up to the AWCPA, the Copyright Office 
 
 140. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213–14 (1954) (finding a sculpture of a dancer used 
as the base of a lamp to be copyrightable); DeSilva Const. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 193 
(M.D. Fla. 1962) (holding architectural works are copyrightable though they are not explicitly 
mentioned in the Copyright Act).  
 141. See Xiyin Tang, Narrativizing the Architectural Copyright Act: Another View of the 
Cathedral, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 33, 34 (2013) (“Given architecture’s claim on our collective 
need for stability, shelter, and aesthetic pleasure, perhaps it is both apt and surprising that 
architecture was not given official status in the United States as a valid, copyrightable art form 
until just under 20 years ago.”). 
 142. NIMMER, supra note 119, § 1.03; see H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668 (stating that within the Act’s treatment of useful articles, 
architectural works present a “special situation” and their copyright protections “would depend 
on the circumstances,” but their plans and drawings would “of course” be protected). 
 143. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 144. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218 (1954) (“The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is not 
beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original and ornamental design 
for design patents.”). 
 145. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., THE REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT ON WORKS OF 
ARCHITECTURE 199 (1989) [hereinafter ARCHITECTURE REPORT], https://www.copyright.gov/
reports/architecture.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR4G-F8NG] (finding some cases “have enjoined 
construction of buildings derived from infringing plans” and a few state decisions “can be read as 
indicating protection would be available for the structure”); see, e.g., Herrald, 213 F. Supp. at 193 
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released a report stating that it generally regarded the calculus for 
architectural works’ copyright eligibility to be the same as that for useful 
articles, or objects defined by their function.146 As stated previously, for an 
aspect of a functional work to be copyrightable, original design elements 
must exist and these elements must be able to be imagined separately 
from the utilitarian aspects of the work.147 Simply put, the question was 
whether a particular feature of an architectural work is “an artistic 
sculpture or decorative embellishment added to the structure” or whether 
its purpose was utilitarian—influencing how one moves within the 
building, how it stores objects, and similar inquiries. According to this 
definition, consider the Team Disney building in Burbank, California, 
which has columns that are nineteen-foot carved depictions of the cartoon 
dwarves from Snow White.148 These columns presumably constitute 
copyright-eligible building-design elements, whereas columns on a 
standard apartment building, whose size and shape are determined simply 
by weight-bearing considerations rather than aesthetic purposes, would 
not. The former’s purpose is tied to its appearance and originality, the 
latter’s purpose is tied to its function or livability.  
D. Passage of AWCPA in 1990 
To reach compliance with the Berne Convention—an 
international contingency of countries agreeing to respect each other’s 
copyrights149—Congress formally granted copyright protections to 
architectural works by way of the AWCPA.150 Largely, the AWCPA 
 
(holding architectural plans and drawings are protectable by copyright under the scientific drawings 
provision of the Copyright Act, though they are not an explicitly protected category).  
 146. ARCHITECTURE REPORT, supra note 145, at 203 (“Nonmonumental works of 
architecture are, concededly, ‘useful articles,’ and thus the question is whether the structure itself 
contains any sculptural features that are ‘capable of existing independently of’ the utilitarian 
aspects of the architectural structure.”). 
 147. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 148. Architect Michael Graves designed this building. Paul Goldberger, Architecture View; A 
New Disney Building Mixes Art with Whimsy, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/
1991/05/12/arts/architecture-view-a-new-disney-building-mixes-art-with-whimsy.html [https://
perma.cc/F5L9-SV7N]. Graves also consulted on the AWCPA. See infra notes 156–164 and 
accompanying text (noting that Congress called Graves to testify as an expert witness on the 
definition of an “architectural work” for the AWCPA). 
 149. Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(1886), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_
berne.html [https://perma.cc/9TQC-3LAR]. 
 150. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 4 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6936–37 
(stating the purpose of the amendment was to reach compliance with the Berne Convention). 
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acts as a compromise in both its definition of what constitutes an 
architectural work and in how far the copyright protections extend.  
The AWCPA carves out a very narrow class of architectural works 
that are eligible for copyright protections. Attempting to avoid providing 
protections for all articles defined by their functionality, the amendment 
defines protected “architectural works” as including “the design of a 
building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a 
building, architectural plans, or drawings.”151 Notably, “building” is not 
defined in the Copyright Act, but an architectural work is further 
defined as the “overall form as well as the arrangement and composition 
of spaces and elements in the design.”152 However, standard features like 
doors and windows are not covered.153 The original draft of the 
amendment included “three-dimensional structures,” such as bridges, in 
the definition, but that was ultimately removed.154 In short, Congress 
sought to create only a narrow protection for buildings and feared 
extending the protections too far to include all useful articles.155  
To ensure it created only a narrow architectural right, Congress 
only called one working architect as an expert witness, Michael 
Graves.156 Graves’s testimony helped define a very narrow class of 
architectural works that would be considered copyright eligible.157 
Graves despised the modernist theories of architecture that premised 
function over form.158 Where modernist architecture, like that 
revolutionized by Frank Lloyd Wright, rejected ornamentation and 
favored minimalist, usually functional elements, postmodern 
architecture, like that by Graves, revered flourish, ornamentation, and 
over-the-top forms that did not at all resemble the function for which 
 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (stating that because “three-dimensional structures” could 
be interpreted too broadly, it was deleted from the amendment).  
 155. Id.; ARCHITECTURE REPORT, supra note 145, at ix (discussing Congress’s preference to 
take a “minimalist approach” to protecting architectural works and its preference to not change 
underlying law regarding useful articles). 
 156. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 6 (listing witnesses). 
 157. See Tang, supra note 141, at 36 (arguing the House Report “unfairly endorses Graves’s 
mode of . . . postmodern building”). 
 158. Id. at 57–58 (asserting Graves’s favoring of “anthropomorphic” elements in architecture 
and rejection of “the Modernist ideal of the machine” codified a binary in the AWCPA where 
elements determined by function are not copyrightable).  
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they were intended.159 With Graves’s influence, the AWCPA formalized 
a bright line between architectural works that are merely functional with 
those that are original or transformative.160 The House Report stated the 
intent of the amendment is to protect only elements that Graves referred 
to as “responsive to issues external to the building, and incorporates the 
three-dimensional expression of the myths and rituals of society.”161 In 
other words, the copyrightability requirements became similar to those 
governing useful articles. To be eligible for copyright protections, the 
architectural work must contain original design elements, and the design 
elements must not be functionally required.162  
The difference between the balancing test used for useful articles 
in the 1976 Act and the test in the 1990 AWCPA amendment is that 
the former requires only that the artistic element can be imagined 
separately from the utilitarian component, whereas the latter judges 
the design element as to whether it serves the function of the 
building.163 So, to return to the Team Disney example, copyrightability 
of buildings under the AWCPA concerns whether the nineteen-foot 
cartoon-dwarf columns were made to accommodate some function of 
the building, rather than whether they can be imagined as existing 
separately from the building. Both inquiries lead to the same 
conclusion—that the elements are copyrightable—however, the 
former focuses on whether an object serves a functional purpose rather 
than if it can just imaginably serve a nonfunctional purpose. 
Additionally, the AWCPA adopted a “pictorial representation” 
exception as a compromise to formalizing protections of architectural 
works.164 Section 120(a) states that the copyright protections for 
covered architectural works do not include “the right to prevent the 
 
 159. Compare FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT, In the Cause of Architecture, in IN THE CAUSE OF 
ARCHITECTURE: FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT, ESSAYS 145, 148 (1975) (commenting on previous 
architecture’s “misfortune to be a non-utilitarian affair”), with MICHAEL GRAVES, A Case for 
Figurative Architecture, in MICHAEL GRAVES: BUILDINGS AND PROJECTS 1966–1981, at 11–13 
(1995) (encouraging a departure from the modernist movement and that “society’s patterns of 
ritual be registered in the architecture”).  
 160. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 19 (“The intent of the legislation is to protect only what 
Mr. Graves calls ‘poetic language.’”). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 20–21. 
 163. See Tang, supra note 141, at 39 (distinguishing the AWCPA functionality test with the 
useful-article separability test). 
 164. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22 (describing the pictorial-representation exception as a way 
to “balance the interests of authors and the public”). 
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making, distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, 
photographs, or other pictorial representations of the work” when the 
architectural work is located where it is visible to the public.165 Not only 
was this exception a common practice in Berne-compliant countries, 
but Congress wanted architectural works to remain a “public art 
form.”166 Congress both expressed a desire to protect the public’s 
ability to commemorate trips to cities through taking photographs or 
purchasing pictorial representations of city-specific architecture and 
reasoned that “[t]hese uses do not interfere with the normal 
exploitation of architectural works.”167 Given that most harm to the 
market value of architectural copyrights occurs when the works are 
infringed by the design of a similar building, Congress noted a “lack of 
harm” caused by pictorial representations.168  
III.  AWCPA’S ACTING AS A LOOPHOLE TO COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTIONS 
More so than any other time in the street art movement, corporate 
and public interests want to link themselves to street art, oftentimes 
using photographs to do so.169 With its pictorial representation 
exception, the AWCPA provides corporate interests with a lucrative 
loophole to dodge paying royalties to artists for art the companies 
feature in their advertisements. The only circuit court to consider the 
issue decided in favor of including exterior artworks within the 
pictorial exception to copyright protections for architectural works.170 
And, further, the car cases, introduced above, could signal the 
beginning of a trend involving various companies weaponizing this 
precedent as a way to feature street art in advertisements without 
infringing any copyrights. This Part challenges Congress’s contention 
 
 165. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2018). Notably, because this acts as a categorical exception to 
pictorial representations, the fair use defense does not come into play. The fair use doctrine can 
be asserted as a defense to excuse an otherwise impermissible reproduction. Id. § 107. Here, the 
statute explicitly states the reproduction is permissible. Id.  
 166. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id.; see also ARCHITECTURE REPORT, supra note 145, at xi (discussing reasons why 
architects desire copyright protections for their designs). 
 169. Supra Part I. 
 170. See Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the 
filming of artistic streetwall towers did not infringe the creator’s copyright because it fell within 
the pictorial representation exception of the AWCPA).  
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that the pictorial representation exception does not create harm among 
copyright holders, illustrating how the overbroad nature of the 
exception has instead created a gap in copyright protections for PGS 
elements incorporated into architectural works. 
Given the relative newness of the AWCPA, the Ninth Circuit is 
the only appellate court to have directly addressed the treatment of 
PGS elements on the exterior of an architectural work. Decided in 
2000, Leicester v. Warner Bros171 dealt with the depiction of towers in 
the background of sweeping shots of downtown Los Angeles in the film 
Batman Forever.172 The towers formed a streetwall to one side of an 
office building, which allowed Warner Brothers to argue that the 
towers served as part of the architectural work of the building and thus 
pictorial representations were permissible pursuant to the AWCPA.173 
The Ninth Circuit found in favor of Warner Brothers based on a fact-
specific inquiry that did not develop a clear test for when PGS elements 
are swallowed up within the pictorial representation exception.174  
The Ninth Circuit identified factors for justifying that the towers 
were a part of the building as a matter of law, including that the towers 
were made from the same material as the building, the structures 
visually extended the sight line of the building, and the design was 
intended to make the towers appear to be part of the architectural 
work.175 The Leicester court emphasized both the architectural and 
functional purposes that the towers served. As for the former, the 
towers were designed to match the materials, spacing, and height used 
for the other pillars in the building, so the towers and the building 
would appear unified.176 Regarding the latter, the towers were designed 
to control street traffic.177 Taking these two purposes into account, the 
court found that the towers were “equally integrated” and “serve[d] 
the same purpose” as towers constructed as part of the office 
building.178 Further, the court broadly defined “building” in the 
 
 171. Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 172. Id. at 1213. 
 173. Id. at 1219. 
 174. See id. at 1217–19 (finding that the streetwall towers are part of the architectural work 
for purposes of the AWCPA due to factors such as being made with the same material as the 
building and visually extending the property line). 
 175. Id. at 1218. 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 1218–19. 
 178. Id. at 1219. 
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AWCPA by pointing to the statute’s legislative history, which favors a 
definition of buildings inclusive of structures “used, but not inhabited 
by humans.”179 In other words, the towers could still fall within this 
definition though they are not humanly inhabitable. Therefore, due to 
the towers’ purpose and the expansive definition of “building” the 
court employed, the towers were found to be a part of the architectural 
work as a matter of law.180 
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the towers were, in fact, PGS 
elements in their own right and were perhaps copyrightable on their own;181 
however, once attached to the architectural work, they became part of the 
“overall form” of the building.182 Once a part of the overall form of the 
architectural work, the pictorial representation exception applied, and 
therefore, filming the towers did not infringe the artist’s copyright.183  
Although at the time Leicester may have seemed like a niche fact 
pattern, it has become increasingly more relevant in the copyright legal 
landscape with the increase in large-scale street art. For example, two 
recent cases involving car advertisements using street art as a 
photographic backdrop have largely relied on Leicester’s logic in an 
attempt to avoid copyright infringement claims by street artists. These 
cases seem split as to whether Leicester’s reasoning should apply to 
claims such as these. 
In Falkner v. General Motors,184 street artist Adrian Falkner sued 
General Motors (“GM”) for copyright infringement after GM posted 
a social media advertisement featuring one of their cars in front of 
Falkner’s mural,185 which was painted on the walls of a structure 
attached to the roof of a parking garage.186 Though the facts are 
remarkably similar to those in Leicester, and both courts use a similarly 
broad definition of “building,”187 the Falkner court denied GM’s 
 
 179. Id. at 1218 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951).  
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. at 1219 (stating that there is no claim for copyright infringement via the pictorial 
representation exception “[w]hether or not Leicester may have some other claim for a different 
infringement of his copyright in the . . . towers as a sculptural work”).  
 182. Id. at 1218–19. 
 183. Id. at 1219. 
 184. Falkner v. Gen. Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
 185. Id. at 928–30. 
 186. Id. at 929; infra note 193.  
 187. Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 936–37 (defining a “building” as a structure that humans use 
rather than live in). 
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motion for summary judgment by differentiating it from Leicester.188 
Whereas the towers in Leicester were “designed to appear as part of 
the building or to serve a functional purpose that was related to the 
building,” the creative decisions involved in the mural in Falkner were 
completely unrelated to the functional purpose of the parking 
garage.189 Thus, the court declined to find as a matter of law that the 
mural was “part of” the parking garage because it was factually 
distinguishable from the factors mentioned in Leicester.190 Falkner 
settled prior to trial.191  
 
FIGURE 3. GENERAL MOTORS ADVERTISEMENT (LEFT)192 AND 
FALKNER’S MURAL (RIGHT) 193 
 
Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis194 took the opposite approach. 
After three separate street artists threatened to sue Mercedes Benz 
(“MB”) for copyright infringement after the company posted 
Instagram advertisements of their cars in front of the artists’ murals, 
 
 188. Id. at 937. 
 189. The court noted the towers in Leicester were designed to look visually similar to the office 
building and served a functional purpose in that they served as a gate to foot traffic. Id. In this 
case, the court noted that the decisions made relating to the mural’s appearance were made based 
on the artist’s previous work rather than with an eye toward acting as an extension of the already 
constructed office building. Id. 
 190. Id.  
 191. Notice of Settlement at 2, Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927 (No. 2:18-cv-00549-SVW-JPR). 
 192. Exhibit G-1 to Alex Bernstein Supplemental Declaration at 13, Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d 
927 (No. 2:18-cv-00549-SVW-JPR). 
 193. Declaration of Adrian Falkner at 10, Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927 (No. 2:18-cv-00549-
SVW-JPR). 
 194. Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, 19-10949, 19-10951, 2019 WL 
4302769 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019). 
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MB filed declaratory judgment suits against each individual artist 
claiming that, due to the AWCPA pictorial representation exception, 
no copyright infringement had occurred.195 The court rejected the 
defendant artists’ motion to dismiss, employing the opposite reasoning 
of Falkner.196 Unlike Falkner, the Lewis court did not engage in a fact-
sensitive analysis of how and why the mural was designed in relation to 
the parking garage. Instead, the court briefly noted the similarities 
between this factual situation and Leicester.197 Namely, both Leicester 
and Lewis involved PGS elements attached to an architectural work 
and thus both warranted the same result.198 Here, the court similarly 
adopted a broad definition of “building” to achieve this result,199 citing 
a district court case that found that a garage, though not necessarily 
“humanly habitable” was still a “building” under the AWCPA because 
the garage was “surely a permanent and stationary structure.”200 
The court dismissed the policy argument that if MB were able to 
further this AWCPA argument, it would effectively wipe out any copyright 
protections available for street artists. Instead, the court left open the 
possibility that “the plaintiff might have an infringement claim where, for 
example, someone created a reproduction of his sculpture divorced from 
the context of the building in which it was embodied, i.e. on a poster, t-shirt, 
or other print media.”201 Essentially, the court distinguished cases of 
infringement involving photographic representations.202 
 
 
 195. Id. at *2–3. 
 196. Compare id. at *5 (analogizing to Leicester by saying “[t]hat is precisely the claim 
Mercedes is asserting here”), with Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (“Very few if any of [the 
Leicester] factors appear to be present in the instant case.”). 
 197. Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5. 
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. at *6–7. 
 200. Id. (quoting Moser Pilon Nelson Architects, LLC v. HNTB Corp., No. 05 CV 422 
(MRK), 2006 WL 2331013, at *6 (D. Conn. Aug. 8, 2006)). 
 201. Id. at *5. 
 202. Id.  
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FIGURE 4. MERCEDES-BENZ’S ADVERTISEMENTS (LEFT) AND 
PLAINTIFFS’ MURALS (RIGHT)203  
 
This line of cases effectively highlights the twin problems with 
applying the AWCPA in cases concerning the copyrightability of PGS 
elements incorporated into a building: the lack of statutory guidance 
on when PGS elements are legally considered “part of” an 
architectural work and the overbreadth of the pictorial representation 
exception. 
First, the Copyright Act provides courts with no express guidance 
about how PGS elements incorporated into architectural works may be 
 
 203. Complaint at *6–7, Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769 (Nos. 19-10948, 19-10949, 19-10951). 
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legally separated for the purposes of copyright protections.204 
Therefore, the courts are given little choice but to rely on the rather 
artificial, fact-sensitive factors outlined in Leicester, or else fashion a 
test of their own.  
Second, both the Lewis and Leicester courts rejected the policy 
argument that the exception’s overbreadth would essentially wipe out 
copyright protections for PGS works incorporated into buildings. In 
doing so, both courts left open the possibility of alternate avenues for 
artists to recover for copyright infringement if the PGS element is 
completely divorced from the building.205 But the courts failed to 
consider how the pictorial representation exception closes off the only 
avenue of copyright infringement—pictorial representation—which is 
inextricably tied to street art’s purpose and value.206 The unauthorized 
use of pictorial representations is harmful to street artists in a way that 
it is not for architects.207 Architectural works have alternate avenues of 
copyright protections, and their value as original and exclusive works 
is not jeopardized by pictorial representations.208 The main value of 
 
 204. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining an architectural work without reference to 
incorporated PGS elements). 
 205. See Lewis, 2019 WL 4302769, at *5 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit recognized that the plaintiff 
might have an infringement claim where, for example, someone created a reproduction of his 
sculpture divorced from the context of the building in which it was embodied.”); Leicester v. 
Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating there was no copyright infringement 
claim for a pictorial representation “[w]hether or not Leicester may have some other claim for a 
different infringement of his copyright”).  
 206. See Riggle, supra note 74, at 249 (describing street art as “an unsolicited aesthetic 
injection” where “one is forced to reconsider one’s purely practical and rather indifferent 
relationship to the street”). 
 207. Journalist Victor Luckerson tells the story of the effect of street art’s meteoric rise on 
street artists. Victor Luckerson, The Rise and Risk of the Mural Economy, RINGER (Oct. 18, 
2018), https://www.theringer.com/2018/10/18/17989192/mural-economy-street-art-detroit-graffiti 
[https://perma.cc/STU8-7CZW]. For example, Ann Lewis was one of several artists who began to 
create street art in Bushwick. Id. She thought the art would be “a gift to local children,” but 
instead it became an “economic engine” driving the area’s transformation. Id. Building owners 
began selling walls to brands for mural advertisements, graffiti tours began charging twenty 
dollars per ticket, and rents rose until Lewis herself was evicted. Id. “[B]ecause we were there, 
developers thought it was a place where they could make money[.] Because we were creating a 
community and creating accessibility to creativity, that was sellable for them,” she said. Id.  
 208. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting copyright holders the exclusive right to “prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work” and “to distribute copies” of the work “to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 101-735, at 22 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953 (describing pictorial 
representations as “not interfer[ing] with the normal exploitation of architectural works” and 
resulting in a “lack of harm to the copyright owner’s market”). 
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having a copyright in architectural works is jeopardized when the 
works’ copyrightable design elements are reproduced in another 
building.209 In a contemporary society where cities, businesses, and 
tourists actively seek out the cultural capital offered by street art,210 the 
pictorial representation exception deprives street artists of the one 
form of copyright protection that is commercially valuable to them. As 
such, it does not create an exception to existing protections—it repeals 
them.  
Further, the fact that street art exists outside the institutional art 
market makes the lack of an explicit statutory copyright protection 
even more glaring. In the traditional world of visual art, dominated by 
galleries and dealers, the value of each work is an artificial function of 
the institutional art world.211 The cost is set by supply and demand 
factors. The supply comes from the finite number of esteemed works 
on the market at any given time, and the demand derives from the 
determination of which works are deemed worthwhile by institutional 
heavyweights like dealers, collectors, investors, museums, and 
companies.212 In the street art context, there is no price-fixing entity 
because street art is a public good. The finite nature of works of art—
including the opportunities to own them and see them—driving price 
on the supply-side in the institutional art world—does not exist when 
street art is open to the public at all times.  
Ordinarily, the property owner reaps the benefits of any supply 
considerations as they own real estate that is unique as a result of the 
street art fixed to it. The one measure of control a street artist has over 
the supply of their work is that it is fixed in a certain location so that 
the only way to see it is to either travel to the location or see a 
reproduction authorized by the artist themself. On the demand side, no 
entity operates as an analog to galleries and dealers, controlling which 
works collectors and consumers deem valuable enough for their 
 
 209. ARCHITECTURE REPORT, supra note 145, at xi (listing reasons for “why architects desire 
to retain rights in their work product” including (1) limiting tort liability if design plans are 
reproduced in a different environment, (2) allowing architects to profit off of reuse of their plans, 
and (3) allowing architects to “prohibit alterations in the design that would detract from the 
desired aesthetic effect”). 
 210. Supra Part I. 
 211. CLARE MCANDREW, An Introduction to Art and Finance, in FINE ART AND HIGH 
FINANCE: EXPERT ADVICE ON THE ECONOMICS OF OWNERSHIP 17 (Clare McAndrew ed., 2010).  
 212. Id.  
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investment.213 On the contrary, in the street art context, each work’s 
value is not a product of the institutional art world, but exists in spite 
of it. Street art’s value derives from its visual appearance and its 
positioning—both historically and physically—as emblematic outsider 
expressions. If companies are able to mass reproduce street art to an 
extended audience without the consent of the artist, the demand will 
not only be diminished but will also be informed by the art’s 
relationship to a commercial, or perhaps political, venture of which the 
artist does not necessarily approve.214 
Moreover, appearing in the background of advertisements could 
be only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the commercial 
exploitation of street art. Though the Leicester and the Lewis courts 
left open the possibility that there could be a cognizable copyright 
infringement claim if a PGS element were recreated in a way that was 
divorced from the building,215 this is not guaranteed. As stated 
previously, copyright protections for PGS elements incorporated into 
buildings are not expressly within AWCPA’s text.216 If a work of street 
art is considered part of the building as a matter of law, there is no 
textual indication that the pictorial representation exception would be 
confined to depictions, like in the car cases, that feature the building 
on which the art is attached.217 Absent a limiting principle, it could 
include reproductions of the art entirely divorced from the actual 
structure of the building—like recreating the art on shirts or mugs—
 
 213. Id. at 18. 
 214. Often, street artists allege harm in copyright infringement claims springing from their 
inability to control if and how their work will be associated with various commercial entities. This 
inability to control their commercial associations impacts an artist’s reputation as well as the 
market value of their work. See, e.g., Corrected First Amended Complaint at 6, Falkner v. Gen. 
Motors LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 2:18-cv-00549-SVW-JPR) (alleging that 
by featuring plaintiff’s work in its advertisements, GM raised revenue for itself but caused 
reputational damage and a decrease in value to the plaintiff’s work); Complaint at 8, Tierney v. 
Moschino S.p.A., No. 2:15-cv-05900-SVW-PJM, 2016 WL 4942033 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016) 
[hereinafter Tierney Complaint] (claiming in a copyright infringement suit against the fashion 
designer Moschino that “nothing is more antithetical to the outsider ‘street cred’ that is essential 
to graffiti artists than association with European chic, luxury and glamour—of which Moschino is 
the epitome”).  
 215. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 217. In fact, street artists have sued for copyright infringement over the unauthorized use of their 
work in other mediums, from Met Gala gowns to coffee cups. See Hayuk v. Starbucks Corp., 157 F. 
Supp. 3d 285, 293 (2016) (finding no copyright infringement where a street artist claimed their work 
was reproduced as part of a Starbucks advertising campaign); Tierney Complaint, supra note 214, at 
7–10 (alleging copyright infringement of street art on a gown worn at the Met Gala).  
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because, legally, the art and the building are one and the same.218 
Therefore, as it stands, there is a plausible, albeit not the most natural, 
reading of the AWCPA that neutralizes all copyright protections for 
street artists—whether divorced from the context of the building or 
not. This Note is not arguing for or against the current copyright 
structure. It simply argues that the current legal scheme for protecting 
creators’ rights219 creates a gaping hole for street art that is problematic, 
especially given the economic and cultural value of street art in modern 
society.220 
IV.  “USEFUL ARTICLES” AS A MODEL FOR COPYRIGHT 
ELIGIBILITY 
Given the problems created by applying the AWCPA and the 
Leicester precedent to uses of contemporary street art, the evolving 
judicial treatment of “useful articles” and attached PGS elements 
provides a helpful model for how works of street art can be treated as 
separate, copyrightable elements under the law. This Part addresses 
the statutory and jurisprudential framework governing “useful 
articles” and posits it as an analytical mechanism for understanding and 
solving the AWCPA’s shortcomings as it relates to the copyrightability 
of PGS works attached to the exteriors of buildings. 
Under § 101 of the Copyright Act, a useful article is defined as “an 
article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to 
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”221 
Useful articles are those whose purpose is defined by their 
 
 218. The cases mentioned in note 217, supra, did not raise the AWCPA defense. However, 
given they were litigated prior to the car cases, it is plausible that the corporate entities were not 
aware of the availability of the AWCPA as a defense. Presumably, the AWCPA defense would 
be attractive to corporate entities, especially compared to the traditionally fact-sensitive 
determinations of copyright infringement. See Hayuk, 157 F. Supp. 3d at 286–93 (making no 
mention of the AWCPA in the final opinion); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Defendant Moschino’s Motion to Dismiss at 1–18, Tierney, 2016 WL 4942033 (making no 
mention of the AWCPA in its answer to the complaint); Tierney Complaint, supra note 214, at 1–
20 (making no mention of the AWCPA in the complaint). 
 219. Scholars have noted the deficiencies in the current copyright scheme and have made 
suggestions for better legal protections for artists. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom 
To Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 482–83 (2007) (arguing 
that copyright law should allow greater artistic freedom to copy parts of other works). 
 220. Supra Part I. 
 221. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
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functionality, rather than their aesthetic character,222 traditional 
examples being lamps, household appliances, and furniture. As 
previously discussed, architectural works used to be treated as useful 
articles prior to the passage of the AWCPA.223 However, unlike the 
AWCPA, there are explicit guidelines within the Copyright Act 
governing how to define the copyrightability of PGS elements when 
they are incorporated in useful articles.224 Section 101 explicitly allows 
for the protection of PGS elements that are part of the design of a 
useful article “if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.”225 
These explicit protections for PGS elements fixed on useful 
articles were enacted in the 1976 amendments to the Copyright Act 
following a Supreme Court case that exposed a copyright loophole for 
PGS elements when they were incorporated into useful articles.226 The 
case, Mazer v. Stein,227 confronted whether a sculpture of a dancing 
couple that doubled as a lamp base could be copyrightable.228 Since a 
lamp is defined by its function, it was not considered a “work of art” 
under the law and thus was not copyrightable.229 However, since the 
sculptural base on its own could meet the criteria for “works of art,” 
the Court deemed it copyrightable.230 The Court held that if a PGS 
object could be copyrightable when divorced from the useful article, it 
was still copyrightable when incorporated into the useful article.231 This 
 
 222. See NIMMER, supra note 119, § 2A.08[A][2] (“Even if an article has a distinctive shape, 
like works of modernistic form sculpture it should still be denied protection if that shape is 
inseparable from its function.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).  
 223. Supra Part II.C. 
 224. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(b)–(c). 
 225. Id. § 101. 
 226. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 50 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5663 
(discussing Mazer v. Stein as introducing separate protections for artworks that can exist 
separately from the useful articles in which they are incorporated). 
 227. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
 228. Id. at 202. 
 229. See id. (framing the question presented as whether statuettes “intended for use and used 
as bases for table lamps, with electric wiring, sockets and lamp shades attached” could be 
copyrighted as “works of art”). 
 230. Id. at 213–14. 
 231. Id. at 218 (“We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the 
intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its 
registration.”). 
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test for parsing out copyrightable and noncopyrightable elements of a 
unified whole was codified in the Copyright Act in 1976.232 With the 
adoption of § 101’s so-called separability test, Congress sought “to 
draw as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of applied 
art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design.”233 
Following this change to copyright protections, courts split over 
how to determine if the PGS element could be conceived as sufficiently 
separate from the useful article.234 Some courts held the PGS element 
must be capable of being physically separated from the useful article, 
while others held that as long as the two could be conceptually 
separated, the PGS element remained copyrightable.235 In 2017, the 
Supreme Court took up the split in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands,236 
a case involving the design elements of cheerleading uniforms.237 
Clothes have long been considered useful articles, and thus void of 
copyright protections; however, the design composed of the 
“arrangements of lines, chevrons, and colorful shapes appearing on the 
surface of respondents’ cheerleading uniforms” was at issue in this 
case.238 Writing for the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas adopted the 
conceptual separability test—and expanded it in various ways that has 
led to confusion and uncertainty in the current separability analysis.239 
Regardless, in short, the Court held that as long as a PGS element 
could be “imagined apart” from the useful article—in this case the 
uniforms—and would qualify for copyright protection on its own, it was 
copyrightable under § 102(a)(5) as a separate PGS element.240 
 
 232. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (“[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of 
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.”). 
 233. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668. 
 234. See Barton R. Keyes, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Surrounding 
Conceptual Separability in American Copyright Law, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 109, 125–27 (2008) (listing 
different separability tests employed by courts to determine the copyright eligibility of PGS 
elements incorporated into useful articles). 
 235. Id. 
   236.   Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). 
 237. Id. at 1007. 
 238. Id. at 1008–09. 
 239. Id. at 1010. For a discussion of the ways in which the new separability test has created 
confusion, see Levi, supra note 55, at 729–34. 
 240. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012. 
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When enacted, § 101’s separability test seemingly governed the 
copyrightability of PGS elements attached to architectural works 
because they were construed as “useful articles” at the time.241 
However, the AWCPA’s passage in 1990 divorced architectural works 
from the § 101 analysis.242 Consequently, the decisions in Mazer and 
Star Athletica do not apply to PGS elements that are incorporated into 
architectural works.243 
More troublingly though, the AWCPA, though removing 
architectural works from the reach of the § 101 separability test, does 
not provide a respective test for the treatment of PGS elements 
incorporated into architectural works. Neither the legislative history 
nor the report by the Copyright Office discusses the PGS protections 
that would be stripped when architectural works were no longer 
considered “useful articles.”244 Thus, it seems unlikely that Congress 
intentionally abrogated the copyrightability of PGS elements on 
buildings. Instead, it is more probable that this was merely a drafting 
oversight, occurring against the backdrop of a very young street art 
movement, which, in 1990, still lacked institutional legitimacy.245  
V.  CLOSING THE COPYRIGHT LOOPHOLE 
The AWCPA’s drafting creates a loophole in copyright 
protections for street artists in the midst of their increasing popularity 
and commoditization. It fails to address how PGS elements’ 
copyrightability should be addressed when such elements are 
incorporated into an architectural work,246 and this lack of 
 
 241. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668. 
 242. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951 
(“[T]he copyrightability of architectural works shall not be evaluated under the separability test 
applicable to pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works embodied in useful articles.”). 
 243. See Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis, Nos. 19-10948, 19-10949, 19-10951, 2019 WL 
4302769, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2019) (“[Star Athletica] concerns design elements of useful 
articles, not buildings, and stands for the proposition that design elements of a useful article can 
be PGS works protected by copyright.”). 
 244. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22 (discussing the effects of copyright protections on 
holders of architectural-works copyrights but not PGS artists’ copyrights); ARCHITECTURE 
REPORT, supra note 145, at xi (asserting reasons why those who design architectural works desire 
copyright protections without mentioning PGS works or artists). 
 245. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22 (making no mention of PGS works or street art); 
ARCHITECTURE REPORT, supra note 145, at xi (making no mention of PGS works or street art). 
 246. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining an architectural work without reference to 
incorporated PGS elements). 
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consideration leads to an overly broad exception to copyright 
protections for street artists.247 This Part argues that Congress should 
amend the AWCPA to close this copyright loophole. The amendment 
should perform two actions. First, it should either adopt the 
separability test, codified in § 101, for PGS elements incorporated into 
architectural works or add a definition of “building” to the AWCPA to 
exclude PGS elements. Second, it should narrow the pictorial 
representation exception as it applies to these incorporated elements.  
A. Expressly Adopting the § 101 Separability Test as It Applies to 
Architectural Works 
The AWCPA’s failure to account for how to treat PGS works on 
the exteriors of buildings—most likely a drafting oversight248—is best 
remedied by congressional action. Congress has expressed no intent to 
create separate statutory schemes for PGS elements attached to useful 
articles and those attached to buildings. In fact, the AWCPA was 
enacted when Congress was expanding protections for artists, such as 
through VARA.249 Therefore, a legislative amendment to the AWCPA 
should adopt the separability test outlined in § 101 to assure that street 
artists are protected, no matter the canvas.  
In other words, when a PGS element can be imagined as existing 
separately from the building to which it is fixed, it would be 
copyrightable, assuming it met all other copyright requirements.250 If 
its purpose could not be separated from the functionality of the 
building, then it would not qualify. This solution would alleviate the 
problem of similarly situated works being awarded copyright 
protections when applied to useful articles, like a shirt or a lamp, but 
not a building.251 It would also fulfill the twin aims of the Intellectual 
Property Clause to incentivize artists to pursue the arts through 
facilitating a fair return on their labor investment and to ensure those 
works are published for the public’s benefit.252  
 
 247. Supra Part III. 
 248. See supra note 245 and the accompanying text.  
 249. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (expanding rights of attribution and integrity to visual artists). 
 250. Id. § 101 (stating the design of a useful article is only copyrightable to the extent it 
“incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and 
are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article”). 
 251. Supra notes 227–240 and accompanying text. 
 252. Supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text. 
PEPLOW IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/16/2020  12:08 AM 
2021 PAINT ON ANY OTHER CANVAS 925 
This solution would ensure street art would be governed by the 
same separability analysis as that of other PGS works, without 
adopting the somewhat convoluted and contradictory reasoning of Star 
Athletica. Since the recent Star Athletica decision has confused courts 
and practitioners alike with regard to how to properly apply its 
separability analysis,253 Congress should maintain a consistent 
approach by adopting the § 101 analysis for both useful articles and 
architectural works. This way, if Star Athletica is tinkered with or 
altered, the analysis will hold for both street art and PGS works 
generally. 
The car company cases demonstrate that current jurisprudence 
allows nearly identical factual situations to yield different results solely 
based on which Leicester factor the court decides is determinant.254 A 
statutory fix would create uniformity and protect artists’ expectations. 
As applied to the car company cases, this proposed statutory solution 
would have found infringement in both instances as long as the murals 
met all other copyright eligibility requirements. If each mural could be 
imagined as existing separately from the building—on canvas, on 
clothing, or on any other medium—then it would be copyrightable.255 
Accordingly, reproductions of the mural, including photographic or 
video reproductions, would be considered copyright infringement. 
B. Introduce a Clear Definition of “Building”to the AWCPA 
Currently, courts struggle to determine when street art is a part of 
the building to which it is fixed or a separate PGS element. In a 
statutory scheme where the separability analysis differs based on 
whether a PGS element exists upon a useful article or a building, the 
definition of what constitutes a “building” matters greatly. How 
broadly or narrowly courts define the term “building” played a role in 
the outcomes of Leicester and Lewis.256 Those cases demonstrate that 
how a building is defined necessarily impacts whether street art is 
considered a part of the building or its own autonomous work. 
Therefore, absent reconciling the useful-articles and architectural-
 
 253. Supra note 239. 
 254. Supra notes 184–198 and accompanying text. 
 255. Supra Part III. 
 256. If the courts had not found the respective structures to be buildings, the AWCPA would 
not have applied and the cases would have come out the other way. Supra notes 178–183, 198–
200 and accompanying text. 
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works doctrines, a second option would be to more clearly define what 
a “building” is for the purposes of the AWCPA.  
The Copyright Office currently defines buildings as “permanent 
and stationary structures designed for human occupancy.”257 However, 
the legislative history—as well as Leicester and the car company 
cases258—defines a “building” as a structure that humans use rather 
than a structure that humans live in.259 This broad definition, though 
expanding the reach of the pictorial representation exception in those 
cases, actually gives minimal guidance as to how to construe the works’ 
relationship to the buildings upon which they are fixed. Therefore, 
relying on this definition, with the caveat that a building is not inclusive 
of PGS elements fixed to its exterior, would help preserve consistency 
in the use of this definition of “building” while solidifying copyright 
protections for street art.  
C. Narrow the Pictorial Representation Exception as it Applies to 
PGS Elements 
Regardless of whether Congress adopts the § 101 separability 
analysis or adds a definition of “building” to the AWCPA, it should 
narrow the pictorial representation exception to account for street art. 
The AWCPA’s legislative history cited a “lack of harm” to the 
architectural-copyright holder’s market to justify the breadth of the 
pictorial representation exception.260 As mentioned previously, the 
harm caused by infringement of an architectural work’s copyright does 
not look the same as the harm caused by infringement of a street artist’s 
copyright.261 In passing the exception, however, Congress expressed 
clear intent to maintain architecture as a “public art form.”262 
Therefore, narrowing the pictorial representation exception to 
acknowledge street art must be done with this in mind.  
Permissible uses should be informed by both the legislative history 
of the AWCPA, which showed that Congress worried about tourists’ 
abilities to take pictures of buildings for personal or recreational 
purposes, and case law regarding fair and de minimis uses of street 
 
    257.   37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2) (2020). 
 258. Supra notes 178–180, 187, 198–200 and accompanying text. 
 259. H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 20 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6951. 
 260. Supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 261. Supra notes 206–213 and accompanying text. 
 262. Supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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art.263 Courts have found de minimis pictorial representations of street 
art when used for only a few seconds in the background of a television 
show264 and when used as a video backdrop for a single song during a 
concert.265 When assessing whether a use is de minimis, courts looked 
to factors such as the “observability” of the work in the representation, 
whether an average observer would recognize the work due to the 
length of time it is on camera, the nature of the depiction, and the 
prominence of the work in the pictorial representation.266 In the fair 
use context, courts looked to factors such as the nature and purpose of 
the pictorial representation, the extent to which the street art was used, 
and whether the pictorial representation affected the market of the 
street art.267  
The most workable statutory solution would be to lay out the main 
factors—inspired by de minimis and fair uses—that courts should 
weigh when discerning whether a work of street art falls within the 
pictorial representation exception. The approach should balance the 
AWCPA’s goal of maintaining architecture as a public good while also 
protecting the exclusive rights of street artists. Borrowing from the fair 
use and de minimis doctrines, the statutory amendment should read as 
follows:  
The applicability of the pictorial representation exception will 
be determined by a number of factors, including the following:  
(1) whether a PGS element is fixed to the exterior of the 
building; 
(2) the prominence of the PGS element on the exterior of 
the building;268  
(3) the prominence of the PGS element in the pictorial 
representation, including how long it is featured in a 
video representation;  
 
 263. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 22 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6953 
(discussing the balance between protecting architectural works and allowing the public to engage 
with them). 
 264. Gayle v. Home Box Off., Inc., No. 17-CV-5867 (JMF), 2018 WL 2059657, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 1, 2018). 
 265. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013).  
 266. Gayle, 2018 WL 2059657, at *2. 
 267. Seltzer, 725 F.3d at 1179.  
 268. For the purposes of this statutory language, the definition of “building” will be adopted 
from Part V.B.  
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(4) the nature and purpose of the use, including whether it 
is commercial or transformative;  
(5) the intent of the person creating the pictorial 
representation to feature the building versus the PGS 
element; 
(6) the harm caused by the pictorial representation to the 
market of the PGS element.269 
Bearing these factors in mind, pictures of buildings for personal or 
recreational purposes would still be permissible, but prominent use of 
the work in advertisements to sell something other than the building to 
which the PGS works are incorporated would be impermissible under 
this new statutory scheme. The legislative solution would effectively 
protect street artists’ work from being exploited commercially, while 
still maintaining the exceptions Congress intended for tourists, as well 
as other recognized fair uses.270  
In the car company cases, this would mean that the photo 
representations of the murals, made for the purpose of car 
advertisements without the express authorization of the artist, would 
be copyright infringement. In a case such as Leicester, on the other 
hand, where street art appears in the background of a movie, it could 
be permissible depending on the extent it was featured, the intent of 
the user, and the impact on the artist’s market. Further, if someone 
took a photo in front of the mural for their own personal use—to post 
on their own Instagram, put in a scrapbook, or email to a friend—it 
would be permissible.271 Likewise, news coverage and advertisements 
 
 269. This statutory language borrows and supplements from analogous doctrines to better 
protect street artists’ rights under copyright law. Factors two, three, and four reframe components 
of the fair use doctrine, outlined in § 107 of the Copyright Act, to more specifically apply to 
pictorial recreations of street art. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). Factor three borrows from the de 
minimis use doctrine, which states that a use is not infringement if it takes so little of the 
copyrighted work the “average audience would not recognize the appropriation.” Newton v. 
Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Factor four borrows from § 113 of the Copyright 
Act, which outlines a few instances where pictorial representations of useful articles with PGS 
elements fixed upon them are permissible if the purpose is to advertise, comment, or report on 
the useful article itself. 17 U.S.C. § 113(c). Factor four is an application of this idea to the street 
art context. 
 270. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (allowing for a fair use defense to copyright infringement “for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching[,] . . . scholarship, or research”). 
 271. Many intellectual property scholars have advanced the idea that a zone exists in 
copyright law of lawful personal use. For a more in-depth discussion of one scholar’s definition of 
what the zone of lawful personal use should include, see generally Jessica D. Litman, Lawful 
Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007). 
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for the building upon which the street art is fixed would be permissible. 
Again, this proposal seeks to protect public engagement with the work 
but balances that engagement with the need to protect street artists 
from commercial exploitation. Considering street art’s public nature 
and Congress’s intent to retain architecture’s public form under the 
AWCPA, this solution aims simply to limit unauthorized uses that are 
economically harmful to street artists. Ultimately, the purpose of this 
amendment, like the purpose of copyright law generally, is to prevent 
commercial exploitation rather than to prohibit all types of 
engagement with the work. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of copyright law is to promote innovation in the 
arts,272 the type of innovation that made art of Brillo Boxes and a 
museum out of public streets. Yet, the law currently provides 
formalized protections for architectural works at the expense of the 
very innovation the law was intended to protect. As postmodernists 
taught the art world, the medium on which art exists is part of its 
innovation and value as creative work. This is now recognized in some 
capacity by both the institutional art world and the Supreme Court. 
The Brillo Boxes are allowed inside the gallery, and art is now 
copyrightable when emblazoned on the front of cheerleading uniforms. 
Street art, though, remains on the outside looking in. 
Until Congress updates the Copyright Act to account for the rise 
of the street art movement, street artists will be one of the only parties 
who are restricted in their ability to profit off of reproductions of their 
own work. Although property owners and corporate interests alike 
seem to use street art’s cultural capital to their own advantage, the U.S. 
Code has not caught up. Copyright legislation, by its nature, is subject 
to change as long as art continues to expand and evolve. Street art 
shows that this game of catch up is a worthy endeavor. Its financial and 
cultural value make it worthy of protecting. Or, at least, of having the 
same protections it would receive if it were paint on any other canvas. 
 
 272. Supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text. 
